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United Nations General Assembly in 1984 reflected continuing international
concern over the use of torture as an instrument of state policy
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The unanimous adoption of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1984 reflected continuing international concern over the use of torture as an instrument of state policy
and practice in many parts of the world.' Modelled in both form and
substance after several earlier multilateral conventions directed against
terrorist acts,2 the Convention is aimed at elimination of torture by establishing an effective international regime for the criminal prosecution
of torturers. While the Convention is certainly not the first international instrument to criminalize acts violating internationally recog* Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refugees, U.S. Department of
State. Mr. Stewart was involved in the Executive Branch's efforts to obtain the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Torture Convention. However, the views
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of the
Department of State or the U.S. Government.
1. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doec. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1027
(1984), entered into force June 26, 1987. For the negotiating history of the Convention,
see J. H. BURGERS AND H. DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK (1988); see also N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
2. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
("Hijacking"), done at The Hague, December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No.
7192; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation ("Sabotage"), done at Montreal, September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents ("Protection of Diplomats"), done at New York, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. 8532; and the
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages"), done at New

York, Dec. 17, 1979,

-

U.S.T.

,

T.I.A.S.

,

reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL

1456-63 (1979). The United States is party to all of these conventions, as
well as the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, done at Washington, February 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S.
8413.
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nized human rights, it is one of the most specific and comprehensive.3
Now that the Senate has given its advice and consent to ratification, the United States is poised to become party to the Torture Con-

vention. 4 While strongly supportive of other recent efforts to adopt international criminal regimes 5, the United States has historically had
great difficulty in adhering to so-called human rights treaties. Indeed,
the Torture Convention is only the second such treaty recently to receive advice and consent (the other was the Genocide Convention, rati3. It is not the only multilateral convention specifically addressed to the problem
of torture. Within the OAS, a parallel Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture was adopted in 1985 by the OAS General Assembly. See 25 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 519 (1986). The 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Eur.T.S. No. 126, reprintedin
27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1152 (1988), entered into force Feb. 1, 1989, supplements
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by establishing a committee of experts to conduct on-site visits to places of detention within States Party and to make recommendations thereon. A similar approach is
taken by the proposed Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention, the second draft of
which is currently before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. See generally Cassese, A New Approach to Human Rights: the European Conventionfor the Prevention
of Torture, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1989).
4. A joint resolution of Congress had endorsed United States participation in the
negotiation of the Convention. See Pub. L. 98-447, 98 Stat. 1721 (1984). The Convention was signed by the United States on April 18, 1988 and submitted to the Senate by
President Reagan on May 20, 1988. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting
the Convention Against Torture and Other Treatment or Punishment, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 642-643 (May 20, 1988) [hereinafter the President's Transmittal].
Following a public hearing, and extensive consultations with the Executive Branch as
well as interested groups in the private sector, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported favorably on the Convention. See Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Hearing Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Committee
Hearing]; Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. ExEc. REp. No. 30, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30]. The Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification on October 27, 1990. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-92
(daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). The United States will not deposit its instrument of ratification until after the Congress has adopted necessary implementing legislation. See Appendix A to SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30.
5. See, e.g., the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF/82/15 Rev. 1, adopted by
consensus Dec. 19, 1988, reprinted in 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 493 (1989). The
United States instrument of ratification was deposited with the U.N. on Feb. 20, 1990.
See generally Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DEN. J.
INT'L L. AND PoL'y 387 (1990).
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fication of which took some forty years),6 Some of the reasons for this
longstanding reticence were re-examined during the Senate's consideration of the Torture Convention and are reflected, to a greater or lesser
extent, in the package of provisos on which the Senate conditioned its
advice and consent. 7
This article briefly reviews the most important provisions of the
Torture Convention and examines the various reservations, declarations
and understandings contained in the Senate's resolution of advice and
consent." The conditions that the United States intends to impose on its

6. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
done at Paris, Dec. 9, 1948, U.S.T. ...... , T.I.A.S. .
, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(1951), was initially submitted to the Senate in 1949 and received advice and consent
only in 1986. See 132 CONG. Ruc. S1355-1381 (daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986), and the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat.
3045 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§1091-1093). The United States is also party to
several earlier multilateral human rights treaties concerning slavery, the political rights
of women, and refugees. Five human rights treaties submitted to the Senate during the
Carter Administration remain pending. See generally Lillich, The United States Constitution and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 53 (1990).
7. The Senate had before it an initial package of reservations, declarations and
understandings proposed by the Reagan Administration when it submitted the Convention for advice and consent. See Summary and Analysis of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, contained
in the President's Transmittal, supra note 4, at 1-18. The Reagan proposals were criticized on a number of grounds, and in consequence a revised package was formulated
by the Bush Administration, which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted
with some modifications. See Committee Hearing, supra note 4; SENATE ExEc. REP.
No. 30, supra note 4, at Appendix A. Only minor modifications were made on the floor
by the full Senate. See 136 CONG. REc. S17486 et seq. (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). For
a critique of the Bush Administration proposals, see The Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 42 THE REc. OF
THE ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF

NEw YORK 235 (1987).

8. The "package" finally adopted by the Senate includes two reservations, five
understandings, two declarations and a "proviso". See 136 CONG. REc. S17486-92
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). For present purposes, only the final versions of these conditions, as contained in the resolution of advice and consent to ratification (which is appended to this Article), are discussed.
As a matter of international law, a reservation is required when a state party purports to exclude or modify the substantive legal effect of an international agreement in
its application to that state. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, Art 2 § 1(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; RESTATEMENT (TinuR) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TM UNITED STATES §313 (1986)("A state may enter a reservation to
a multilateral international agreement . . ."). It is the substantive effect of a proviso,
not its label, which is controlling. In United States practice, a reservation is distinquished from a statement of understanding, which is binding domestically but not inPublished by NSUWorks, 1991
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adherence to the Convention illustrate some of the current limitations
of the international system in establishing effective criminal sanctions
on a global basis. These conditions also demonstrate the problems of
reception or incorporation which international criminal law can encounter at the domestic level.
I. BACKGROUND
The prohibition against torture is hardly a new development in international law. Indeed, it has been recognized so often and so widely
that most scholars and practitioners consider it a principle of customary international law binding on all states. 9 Persistent non-compliance
with the prohibition, however, led the United Nations General Assembly to adopt, in 1975, a comprehensive Declaration defining and elaborating the substantive prohibition."0 Subsequently, in 1977, the General
Assembly called upon the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to draft
a multilateral convention incorporating the principles set forth in the
Declaration." The Commission completed its work in 1984, and the
General Assembly adopted the Convention by consensus on Human
ternationally. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §314. The terms "declaration" and "proviso" encompass conditions
which may be legally or politically relevant or important but which do not modify
substantive legal obligations under either domestic or international law.
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §702; Ackerman, Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment in InternationalLaw, 11 VAND. J. OF INT'L L. 653 (1978). The prohibition
is found, inter alia, in art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); art.
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Dec. 19, 1966;
art. 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); art. 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969);
and art. 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). Torture is
also prohibited by the humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts (see the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protections of victims of war, including the Additional Protocols of 1977). Even the U.S. Senate considered the Convention to represent
a codification of customary international law. See SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30 supra
note 4, at 3. Within the European human rights system, several cases have examined
the issue of which acts constitute torture. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur.
H.R.R. 25 (ser. A) (1978); Greek Case, 12 Y.B.Eur.Conv.Hum.Rts. (1969); cf. Tyrer
v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R.R. 1 (ser. A)(1978).
10. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
30/3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
'11. U.N. Res. 32/62 (Dec. 8, 1977).
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Rights Day, December 10, 1984. It entered into force on June 26,
1987; as of the end of 1990, a total of 52 states had become Party
through ratification or accession, and 21 others (including the United
States) had signed but not yet ratified the Convention.
The significance of the Torture Convention lies less in its restatement of the well-established prohibition against torture than in its creation of interlocking law enforcement obligations among States Party to
take steps to bring alleged offenders to justice. The Convention can be
considered, in this respect, primarily as a law enforcement rather than
human rights treaty- although it also contains important preventive
and remedial provisions. Its principal application by States Party will
presumably be through prosecutions and other governmental law enforcement measures as opposed to invocation as a cause of action in
civil suits. Most of the problems it posed with respect to U.S. ratification turned on the manner in which the Convention affected law enforcement interests.
II.

PROVISIONS

The central provisions of the Convention require each State Party:
1) to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction; 2) to
ensure that such acts-including attempts and complicity - are criminal offenses under its domestic law; and 3) to cooperate with all other
States Party to ensure that alleged torturers will be criminally prosecuted, by relying on so-called "universal jurisdiction" and the duty to
extradite or prosecute alleged torturers.
The Convention defines torture to include any act by which severe
mental or physical pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted upon a
person by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiesence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.12 States
12. Art. 1(1) states:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
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Party are obliged both to prevent all acts meeting that definition and to
make them. a crime under their domestic laws punishable by appropriately severe penalties.1" Each State Party must establish jurisdiction
over offenses committed in any territory under its jurisdiction (and on
board its registered ships or aircraft) or by its nationals, and may, if
that State considers it appropriate, do so with respect to acts of torture
against its nationals wherever those offenses occur.14
Torture is made an extraditable offense in all existing and future
extradition treaties between States Party, and each State Party is
obliged, under the aut dedere aut judicare principle, to submit the case
for prosecution if it does not extradite an alleged offender found within
its jurisdiction, regardless of where the offense was committed, who
committed the offense, or the individual against whom the offense was
committed.15 States Party must also provide each other with the greatest measure of assistance in connection with such proceedings.1 6
In an effort to prevent as well as punish torture, the Convention
requires States Party to take various educational and remedial steps to
strengthen their domestic legal regimes, including providing the means
for compensation and rehabilitation of victims.17 Notably, Article 16
calls upon each State Party to undertake to prevent "other forms of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment not amounting
to torture" as that term is defined in the Convention, inte, alia through
many of the same educational and remedial measures. Finally, borrowing from other human rights treaties, the Convention establishes a
13. Art. 2(1), 4(1) and (2). Attempts to commit torture, as well as complicity
and participation, must also be prohibited. The Convention does not require enactment
of a specific offense of torture corresponding to the definition in art. 1, only that all acts
falling within that definition must be criminal offenses under domestic law. It does
specifically provide, however, that neither exceptional circumstances, such as a state of
war or political instability, nor an order from a superior, may be invoked as a justification of torture. Art. 2(2) and (3). These latter provisions are strongly suggestive that
the Convention was intended to apply in times of war as well as pe.ce. Interestingly,
the Convention does not make torture a crime under international law or even specify
that it is "an international criminal activity," as is the case, for example, with respect
to illicit narcotics trafficking under the new U.N. Convention.
14. Art. 5(1).
15. Art. 7 and 8. Art. 5(2) provides the so-called "universal jurisdiction" to submit the case for prosecution, whether or not any of the other grounds of jurisdiction
exist, when an alleged offender is present in a State Party and that State does not
extradite him to a State having jurisdiction under Art. 5(1).
16. Art. 9.
17. Art. 10-14.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/5
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Committee Against Torture to monitor and enforce compliance with its
provisions, on the basis of reports from States Party, its own inquiries,
and consideration of complaints that other States Party or individuals
submit.'
III.
A.

CONDITIONS TO RATIFICATION

Definition of Torture

A central purpose of the Convention is to establish, as a matter of
treaty obligation, a standard, uniform definition of torture to be applied
by each State Party as a matter of its domestic criminal law.' 9 It does
so not by describing the particular acts or practices which are proscribed but rather by articulating the criteria to be applied in determining whether a given act amounts to torture as opposed to a lesser form
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.20 Thus, according to Article 1, "torture" includes any act by which severe mental
or physical pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted for purposes of
punishment, coercion, intimidation or discrimination, by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity, excluding lawful sanctions. 21
By stressing the extreme nature of torture, by requiring both specific intent and specified motives, and by limiting the context to one
involving improper use of governmental authority, this definition describes a relatively limited set of circumstances likely to be illegal
under most, if not all, domestic legal systems. Without question, any
such act would be criminal under existing federal or state law in the
United States. Precisely because the Convention contemplates criminal
prosecutions, however, there was concern within the Executive Branch
to ensure that the treaty definition satisfied United States Constitutional standards of clarity and precision. This was particularly true
with respect to the inclusion of mental pain and suffering, which was
critical to ensure that the Convention's protections extended to the psychological effects of such methods as mock executions, sensory deprivation, use of drugs, and confinement to psychiatric hospitals, but which
some thought fell short of constitutionally required precision. 2
18. Arts. 17-24.
19. See SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30, supra, note 4, at 13.

20. See id.
21. Art. 1(1), supra note 12.
22. Committee Hearing,supra note 4, at 17.
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
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Accordingly, U.S. ratification will be conditioned on an understanding that, to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and that mental
pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from one of four specified circumstances:
-the intentional or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering;
-the actual or threatened administration or application of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
-the threat of imminent death; or
-the threat that any person will be subjected to any of the
foregoing.2"
For similar reasons of clarity and specificity, United. States adherence will be conditioned on several related understandings relevant to
the definition of torture. In particular, it will be noted that the term
"acquiescence," as used in Article 1, requires that the public official,
prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to
prevent such activity; 24 the definition of torture is intended to apply
only to acts directed against persons in the offender's custody or physical control;25 and, noncompliance with applicable legal procedural standards-for example, a failure to provide a Miranda warning which
might result in the inadmissibility of a subsequent staterent under the
exclusionary rule-does not per se constitute torture.26
23. SENATE EXEc. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at 17.
24. See also the Appendix to this article, infra p. - at II(l)(d) [hereinafter
Appendix].
25. See Appendix at II(1)(b). This is consistent with the intent of the Convention to protect the rights of individuals subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment: "The history of the Declaration and the Convention make it clear that the victims must be understood to be persons who are deprived of their liberty or who are at
least under the factual power or control of the person inflicting the pain or suffering."
J.H. BURGERS AND H. DANELIUS, supra note 1, at 120-121. Thus the use of armed
force for military or police purposes would not by itself constitute torture.
26. See Appendix at II(1)(e). Art. 15 provides that statements which have been
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, "except
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made."
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/5
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B.

Lawful Sanctions Exception

The negotiators of the Convention agreed that the proper application of penal sanctions by the State does not constitute torture. Accordingly, the final sentence of Article 1 (1) states that the definition does
not include "pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions." They were unable, however, further to define
the content of this exception or to agree on whether the lawfulness of
the sanctions in question should be determined by reference to domestic
or international law. 27 Because the exception clearly contemplates sanctions which are, at the least, considered lawful under the relevant domestic law, it was considered necessary to supplement the treaty definition by specifying that the exception means, for the U.S., actions that
United States law authorizes. However, it was also recognized that permitting the "lawfulness" of sanctions to be assessed solely by reference
to domestic law could create a loophole in the definition by which the
exception could swallow the rule.
Accordingly, United States ratification will include an understanding to the effect that "sanctions" includes judicially-imposed sanctions
and other enforcement actions authorized by United States law or by
judicial interpretation of such law, while at the same time expressly
noting that a State Party to the Convention could not, through its domestic sanctions, defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to
prohibit torture. 28 Thus, a sanction which amounted to torture could
not be justified merely on the grounds that it was authorized by domestic law.
C.

Non-Refoulement

An important protection to potential victims of torture is contained
in Article 3, which provides that no State Party shall expel, return
("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where substantial
grounds exist for believing that he or she would be in danger of being
subjected to torture. The Convention does not, however, specify what
constitutes "substantial grounds," leaving that issue to domestic law
27. The original draft text of the Convention limited the exception to sanctions
consistent with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted by the First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (1955), approved by ECOSOC Res. 663C(XXIV) (1957). See J.H.
BURGERS

28.

AND

H. DANELiUs, supra n. 1, at 121.

See Appendix at II(1)(c).
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and requiring only that in making the determination, the competent
authorities take into account all relevant circumstances including,
where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.29 A question to be resolved, therefore, was the standard to be applied under
United States law for determining "substantial grounds."
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, an individual may not normally
be expelled or returned from the United States if his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion ....

"1

The

United States Supreme Court has interpreted this mandatory "withholding of deportation" provision to apply when the threat of persecution is more likely than not."l By comparison, the Court has applied a
somewhat less rigorous burden of proof in the context of eligibility for
a discretionary grant of asylum, requiring only a "well-founded fear of
persecution" in order to meet the statutory standard. 2
In light of these statutory interpretations by the Court, and because adherence to the Convention would require (rather than permit)
non-refoulement, the former, more stringent standard was considered
the appropriate referent as a matter of domestic law. Accordingly, the
Senate adopted an understanding interpreting the non-refoulement provision in Article 3 to mean "if it is more likely than not" that the individual in question would be tortured. 3
D. Private Remedies for Victims
Article 14 provides that each State Party must accord the victim
of torture both a legal right to redress and an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation "including the means for as full rehabilita29.
30.

See Appendix, 11(2).
Pub. L. No. 96-212, §203(e), 94 Stat.102, [codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)

(1980)]. This provision implemented the non-refoulement obligatior of Art. 33 § 1 of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, which the United States undertook when it became party to the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.

No. 6577.
31. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984)(interpreting § 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1989).
32. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (interpreting § 208 of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1989)).
33.

See Appendix at 11(2).
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tion as possible." In the event of the victim's death as a result of torture, his (or her) dependents are entitled to compensation.
As finally agreed by the negotiators, this provision was expressly
limited to acts of torture committed in any territory under the State
Party's jurisdiction. 4 Inexplicably, this limitation was evidently deleted
by mistake in the final document, although the negotiating history supports the restrictive reading. Accordingly, the United States will clarify
its view of the issue by conditioning ratification on an understanding
interpreting Article 14 to require a State Party to provide a private
right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State Party. 5
In rejecting extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over acts of torture,
the Convention reflects a narrower view than some courts have been
prepared to adopt with respect to existing United States law. Under the
Alien Tort Claim Act of 1790,36 United States District Courts are
given jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens "for a tort only, committed against the law of nations." Several cases have found this statute to
apply, at least in principle, to alleged acts of torture committed entirely
outside U.S. jurisdiction by non-U.S. persons; in one, actual as well as
punitive damages were in fact awarded against a former Paraguayan
official alleged
to have tortured the plaintiff's brother to death in
7
Paraguay.
Recent efforts to codify the extraterritorial reach of the civil jurisdiction of United States courts over acts of torture, through adoption of
the proposed Torture Victims Protection Act, have been opposed by the
Executive Branch as inconsistent with the approach that the Torture
Convention has taken, and as legally unwarranted and potentially prob34. See Appendix at H(3).
35. See id.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
37. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980), on remand 577 F.
Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp.
542 (D.D.C. 1981), affid 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1003
(1985); Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), afid
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). See generally RESTATEMENT (TmiRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § § 702 and 703 ("A state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones:
...(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.")("An
individual victim of a violation of a human rights agreement may pursue any remedy
provided by that agreement or by other applicable international agreements."). For a
recent case holding nonjusticiable claims based inter alia on extraterritorial torture, see
Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
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lematic in practice. 8 The proposed Act would effectively open U.S.
courts to cases having no nexus whatsoever to the United States, essentially providing the civil analogue to "universal jurisdiction" in the international criminal field. Absent a treaty providing for such jurisdiction, there would seem to be little justification for such overreaching.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Some commentators have perceived several issues that the Convention presented as creating potentially difficult problems concerning
the relationship between a treaty - which according to Article VI of
the Constitution is the law of the land - and the Constitution itself.
A.

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

As indicated above, Article 16 obligates States Party to undertake
to prevent-but not to prohibit or criminalize-other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment not amounting to torture
as defined in Article 1, "when such acts are committed by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiesence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity." In particular, the same
steps must be taken in this regard under Articles 10-13 as are required
with respect to torture itself: training of law enforcement personnel;
review of interrogation techniques and detention rules and practices;
investigation of violations by State authorities; and ensuring the right
to bring a complaint for investigation.
Arguably, the scope of Article 16 exceeds existing United States
law. Certainly, the phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" as interpreted in other contexts- 9 varies from the closely
analogous prohibitions under various amendments to the United States
Constitution. Because it is unclear how the Convention's. terms will be
38. This was the position taken by the Departments of State and Justice at the
June 22, 1990 hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (no published transcript) concerning two bills introduced in the 1st session of the 101st Congress, namely, H.R. 1662 (introduced April 4,
1989 by Congressman Gus Yatron (D. PA.) and others) and S.1629 (introduced Sept.
14, 1989 by Senator Arlen Spector (R. PA.)).
39. See, e.g., X v. Federal Republic of Germany, (No. 61594/74) 11 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 16 (1977). Corporal punishment, for example, is lawful under the
United States Constitution, unlawful under the analogous provisions of the European
Convention.
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interpreted, it was considered necessary to condition United States ratification of the Convention on a formal reservation to the effect that the
United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16
only insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the fifth, eighth and/or fourteenth amend40
ments to the Constitution.
B.

Death Penalty

As noted at the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Torture Convention, the death penalty does not violate
international law nor does international law require the abolition of the
death penalty.4 1 Many, perhaps even most, countries in the world today
provide for capital punishment for some offenses under their domestic
laws, and none of the major international human rights instruments
prohibits the death penalty.
The Torture Convention itself does not address the death penalty.
Nonetheless, some concern was expressed that its ratification could,
notwithstanding the "lawful sanctions" exception, provide an additional
legal basis on which to oppose the imposition of capital punishment in
U.S. courts. In part, this concern was motivated by the recent decision
of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom,4 2 which held that extradition of a West German national from
the United Kingdom to the United States to stand trial on capital murder charges, for which the penalty could be execution, would violate the
European Convention's prohibition against "cruel and inhumane pun40. See Appendix at I(1). Initially a proposed understanding addressed this potential conflict, but since the intended legal effect was in fact to restrict, rather than
simply to interpret, the legal obligation which the United States was prepared to accept
under Article 16, a formal reservation was considered more appropriate. See SENATE
ExEc. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at Appendix A.
41. Committee Hearing, supra note 4, at 10-11 (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State). Various international conventions - for
example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - do
contain provisions limiting application of the death penalty, and some, such as the 6th
Optional Protocol to the European Convention, prohibit its use entirely. These obligations apply only to states that have affirmatively accepted them through ratification or
accession.
42. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 (ser. A) (1989), reprinted
in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
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ishment." Interestingly, that decision did not turn on a finding that application of the death penalty itself would violate the European Convention, much less international law. Rather, the Court held that,
because the United States legal system permitted extensive appeals in
capital cases, the accused, if convicted, would face the prospect of
spending many years on death row, never knowing whether his sentence
would be carried out, overturned or commuted.43 Given his youth at the
time of the crime, the Court considered this "death row syndrome"
prospectively violative of the accused's human rights."
The Administration proposed -

and the Senate endorsed -

an

understanding reflecting its view that international law does not prohibit the death penalty in order to allay any doubt about the position of
the United States in respect of the capital punishment issue. In addition, to clarify the United States' position on the application of the
death penalty in international law, the Senate consented to the ratification of the Convention on the condition that the Convention neither
restricts nor prohibits the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with the protections of the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution, including any constitutional period of confinement prior to the imposition of the death
penalty. 5
C.

The "'Sovereignty" Proviso

When the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the
Genocide Convention, it did so subject to the following reservation,
which was included in the United States instrument of ratification:
That nothing in the [Genocide] Convention requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the
United States.4
This reservation reflected the view, shared by those who believe
that Senator Bricker was historically and legally correct in proposing
43. Id. at 44-45.
44. Id.
45. See Appendix at HI(4).
46. See

REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RjLATIONS ON THE

S. EXEC. REP. No. 2 at 19 (1985); 132 CONG. REc. S1377
(daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986).
GENOCIDE CONVENTION,
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his amendment to the Constitution,47 that an explicit statement of the
primacy of the Constitution over an arguably or possibly inconsistent
treaty is necessary to avoid any possibility that ratification of the suspect treaty could in some fashion bind the United States to take actions
that the Constitution prohibited.
When consideration was given to the Torture Convention, neither
the Administration nor a majority of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee shared this view. As indicated in the Committee's report,
the Convention does not textually and could not, as a matter of domestic law, require the United States to take any legislative or other actions that the Constitution prohibited.4 In Reid v. Covert49 the Supreme Court stated that it had "regularly and uniformly recognized the
supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty." This principle is acknowledged as definitive.50 Even if an inconsistency did exist between
the Constitution and the Convention, a constitutional reservation by the
Senate would thus add nothing in the way of constitutional protection.5 1 Such a reservation could, however, raise questions among other
States Party to the Convention as to the extent of United States obliga47. For a useful recent account of the debate, see D.

TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER

A ENDNMENT CONTROvERSY: A TEST OF EIsENHoWmR's POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).

As initially proposed, the so-called Bricker amendment, S.J. Res. 102, 82nd Cong. 1st
Sess., 197 CONG. REc. 11344 (1951), would have repealed the second paragraph of
Article VI of the Constitution and precluded, inter alia, treaties respecting or abridging
rights and freedoms of United States citizens recognized by the United States Constitution. Subsequent versions, including the one finally voted on and defeated, provided
that a provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with the
Constitution shall not be of any force and effect. The "sovereignty" reservation to the
Genocide Convention is a variant on this theme.
48. SENATE ExEc. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at 4.
49. 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 302(2): "No provision of an [international] agreement may contravene any of the prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution applicable to the exercise
of authority by the United States;" see also id. at Comment (b): "The view, once held,
that treaties are not subject to constitutional restraints is now definitively rejected.
Treaties and other international agreements are subject to the prohibitions of the Bill
of Rights and other restraints on federal power. .. ."
51. However, such a reservation could be unsettling at the international level,
since it could.raise questions as to the exact nature of the treaty obligations undertaken
by the United States pursuant to the Convention. For other States Parties unfamiliar
with the United States Constitution and its interpretation by United States courts, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to assess the precise effect of the "proviso" or
"reservation" on the legal undertakings of the United States under the Convention.
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tions under the Convention and, much more damaging, lead others to
invoke their own Constitutions to limit compliance with the Convention's central provisions, including the prohibition against torture and
the obligation to extradite or prosecute torturers.5
Nonetheless, when the Convention reached the floor of the Senate,
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina expressed continued concern
over the necessity of clarifying and preserving the supremacy of the
Constitution over any inconsistent treaty provision. He stressed, however, in particular, the importance of doing so with respect to "international criminal law treaties" under which the United States accepts an
obligation to conform its domestic law to international standards, because of the potential harm that could be done to the safeguards guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.5" For this reason, he noted, i:he Senate had
attached so-called "sovereignty" reservations not only to the Genocide
Convention, but also to subsequently considered Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLAT's") and to the Vienna Illicit Trafficking Convention, eight times in all.5
Others - for example, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan - considered the "sovereignty" reservation to have been a raistake, noting
that it could be read as a matter of international law to render uncertain the extent of obligations that the United States had undertaken
pursuant to the Convention. 5 Unlike a narrowly drawn reservation to a
specific article or clearly identified undertaking, the "sovereignty" reservation broadly purports to condition every provision of the treaty on
the entire corpus of evolving United States constitutional jurisprudence.
Not only are other nations then left to question the meaning and reach
of United States adherence to the Convention, but some, could also be
drawn to attempt to condition their undertakings on their own domestic
constitutional law. Such a development would clearly undermine the
uniformity and universality which lie at the heart of a multilateral approach to the elimination of torture.5

See, e.g., SENATE EXEC. REP. 30, supra note 4, at 5.
53. See 136 CONG. REc. S17487-89 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
54. 136 CONG. REC. S17489 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
55. Indeed, some twelve countries have made just such an objection to the comparable condition imposed on U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention, and others
have indicated their intention to oppose a similar reservation if taken with respect to
the Torture Convention. Four of the six states involved with recent MLAT's have expressed strong concerns and/or take reciprocal reservations. See SENATE ExEc. REP.
No. 30, supra note 4, at 4-5.
56. See 136 CONG. REc. S17489-90 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
52.
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To avoid these pitfalls, while at the same time recognizing the primacy of the Constitution as a matter of domestic law, the Senate
agreed to include in its resolution of advice and consent a statement which is neither a reservation nor an understanding to the Convention,
and which need not be included in the instrument of ratification - that
"[t]he President of the United States shall not deposit the instrument
of ratification until such time as he has notified all present and prospective ratifying party to this Convention that nothing in this Convention
requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by
the United States."5
D. Federal-StateProvision
Many provisions of the Convention impose obligations that necessarily implicate State and local governments in addition to the Federal
government. For example, the central undertakings to criminalize torture and to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture apply throughout the territory
under the jurisdiction of each State Party58 and thus apply at the State
and local levels. 59 With respect to a few provisions requiring specific
prophylactic and preventive measures, the question arose over the extent of the Federal government's undertaking to ensure that State and
57. See Appendix at IV; 136 CONG. REc. S17488 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). In
proposing this formula, Senator Clairborne Pell (D. R.I.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted in particular that because it is not a reservation, other
countries cannot invoke it on a reciprocal basis to limit or eliminate their obligations to
comply with the Convention, and the President can comply with the proviso simply by
notifying all countries of the U.S. position.
58. Art. 2 and 4.
59. As indicated in the Reagan Administration transmittal, any act of torture in
the United States, including acts constituting attempts or conspiracy to torture, would

unquestionably violate criminal statutes under existing state and/or federal law. When
such acts are subject to state jurisdiction, the offense would likely be a common crime,

such as assault or murder. In some circumstances, the nature of the activity or the
persons involved could also give rise to a federal offense, such as interstate kidnapping
or hostage-taking under such statutes as 18 U.S.C. § § 1,12, 114, 115, 878, 1201 and

1203. Acts subject to federal jurisdiction would violate statutory provisions against assault, maiming, murder, manslaughter, attempt to commit murder or manslaughter,
and rape. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § § 113, 114, 1111, 1112, 1113 and 2241-2245 (1988).

In addition, federal law defines two "constitutional crimes" under 18 U.S.C. § § 241
and 242 that would likely be relevant to any situation covered by the Convention.
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local governments comply. In particular, attention was focused on Articles 10-14, which require States Party to:
-ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of persons
involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of persons arrested, detained or imprisoned;6 0
-keep under systematic review its interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices for the custody and treatment of persons arrested, detained or imprisoned;61
of allegations
---conduct prompt and impartial investigations
62
of acts of torture within their territories;
-provide individuals the right to bring complaints of torture
and to have such cases promptly and impartially examined;6 3 and
to

enforceable rights of redress,
-provide victims of torture6 with
4
compensation and rehabilitation.
Under Article 16, States Party assume similar obligations with respect
to the prevention of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment not amounting to torture, except that the Convention does not
require provision of rights of redress or compensation.
In view of the division of authority between Federal, State and
local governments in the United States, and considering the largely decentralized distribution of police and related authorities at all levels, it
was considered necessary to clarify, primarily for the benefit of the international community, that the Convention would not be implemented
solely by the Federal government or by Federal law. This clarification
was particularly necessary in respect to those preventive measures
which would in the first instance fall to State and local governments.
The object is not to limit or modify United States obligations under the
Convention but rather to indicate that implementation of those obliga65
tions will necessarily take place with respect to the Federal system.
60. Art. 10(1). This provision covers law enforcement personnel (civil and military), medical personnel, public officials and others.
61. Art. 11.
62. Art. 12.
63. Art. 13. States are also obliged to take steps to ensure that the complainant
and witnesses are protected against all in-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of

the complaint or any evidence given.
64. Art. 14.
65. The provision is thus to be distinguished from a traditional "federal-state
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/5
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For this purpose, the United States instrument of ratification will include the statement, characterized as an understanding, that "this Convention shall be implemented by the United States to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over matters covered by
the Convention and otherwise by the State and local governments. Accordingly, in implementing Articles 10-14 and 16, the United States
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to
the end that the competent authorities of the constituent units of the
United States of America may take appropriate measures for the ful-

fillment of the Convention." 66
V.

NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATY

Although the Convention, subject to the aforementioned provisos,
is deemed consistent with United States law (or, stated otherwise,
United States law is considered already to satisfy the substantive requirements of the Convention), it was considered nonetheless preferable

to leave technical implementation of the Convention to the domestic
legislative and judicial processes. Accordingly, the Senate declared that
the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 are "non-self-executing," by
which it is meant they do not establish rights enforceable in United
clause" having the object of releasing a central government from international obligations which would require action beyond its power. See generally RESTATEMENT
(TmRD)OF nm FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THm UNITED STATES § 302, Reporters'
Note 4 ("A 'federal-state clause' is likely to render a federal state's commitment under
an international agreement less onerous than that of unitary states. Such clauses are
therefore more likely to be acceptable in multilateral agreements reflecting common
purposes than in those containing reciprocal exchanges.") The issue is not whether such
a provision is required, for example under the tenth amendment to the Constitution,
but whether a statement for the record is advisable.
66. See Appendix at 11(5). This issue was initially addressed in a proposed reservation to the Convention, which suggested to some that the United States was in fact
not accepting an international legal obligation to implement the Convention to the extent that it required action beyond the existing scope of Federal legislative and judicial
jurisdiction. A reservation may have seemed appropriate to those who anticipated that
the Convention could or would be used by the Federal government to expand its legislative and judicial jurisdiction into areas now primarily or exclusively the province of
State and local authorities. Since neither was the case - the United States intends to
implement the Convention fully and consistently with the Federal system - the reservation was rewritten and recast as an understanding by the Senate, and the amended
version was introduced on the Senate floor. See 136 CONG. REc. S17486 (daily ed.,
Oct. 27, 1990). An interesting, and one assumes hypothetical, issue concerns the refusal of state or local authorities to comply with Convention obligations.
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States courts unless and until Congress has approved implementing legislation.67 This provision concerns only the domestic effect of the Convention and does not limit or alter the extent of the United State's

international obligations thereunder.
VI.

COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE

To monitor and supervise compliance with its provisions, the Convention establishes an international Committee Against Torture, consisting of ten experts in the human rights field.68 States Party are
obliged to submit to the Committee, within one year after ratification
or accession and every four years thereafter, reports on the measures
they have taken to give effect to the Convention; the Committee consid-

ers and comments upon these reports at its semiannual meetings.8 9 In
addition, the Committee has competence: (1) to investigate reports of
the use of torture by States Party when it receives "reliable information which appears. . .to contain well-founded indications that torture
is being systematically practiced in the territory of a State Party;"70
(2) to consider complaints by one State Party that another is not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, where both States have rec67. See Appendix at III(1). For the distinction between "self-executing" and
"non-self-executing" treaties and agreements, see generally RESTATE;MENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111.

Given the language of

the Convention, for example requiring each State Party to criminalize acts of torture
and to take "effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures" to prevent such acts, there is little room to argue that the Convention was intended to.be selfexecuting. Since United States law, at both the federal and state levels, seems to be
fully in compliance with the Convention, it may only be necessary to establish federal
jurisdiction over offenses committed by United States nationals outside the United
States, and over foreign offenders committing torture abroad who are later found in a
territory under United States jurisdiction, under Art. V(l) and (2) respectively.
68. Art. 17. The experts are required to be persons of "high moral standing and
recognized competence;" while nominated and elected by States Parties, they serve in
their individual capacities, not as representatives of governments. Creation of such
oversight bodies is common in contemporary multilateral treaty practice where there
are no existing international structures to perform the function; for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights established a similar body, the Human
Rights Committee, while the Vienna Illicit Trafficking Convention conferred supervisory responsibilities on two standing UN bodies, the International Narcotics Control
Board and the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 403.
69. Art. 19(1), (3), and (4). See generally Report of the Committee Against
Torture, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 44), U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990).
70. Art. 20(1).
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ognized the Committee's competence to do so;1 and (3) to consider
complaints by or on behalf of individuals claiming to be victims of a
State Party has
violation of the Convention by a State Party if that
72
recognized the Committee's competence to do so.
In addition to submitting the required periodic reports to the Committee, the United States will recognize and accept the Committee's
competence to investigate any reliable reports it may receive indicating
a systematic practice of torture in the United States, and to consider
complaints other States Party have lodged concerning alleged violations
of the Convention by the United States - if the opposing State Party
has made a reciprocal declaration.73 Because of this reciprocity, accepting the possibility of State-to-State complaints will permit the
United States to participate actively in the Committee's work by focusing attention where it may be most warranted. Since the Committee's
authority to investigate reliable reports of a systematic practice of torture is accepted unless specifically declined, the United States' instrument of ratification need only include a declaration recognizing the
competence of the Committee to receive State-to-State complaints
under Art. 21 on the basis of reciprocity.74
By contrast, the United States will not, at least at this point, accept the competence of the Committee to consider individual complaints of treaty violations. Under Art. 22, such complaints are admissible only after the individual has exhausted all available domestic
remedies - except when the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to be effective. Given the extensive protections of the United States legal system, it is highly unlikely that any
complaint of torture by United States authorities not already resolved
under United States law would be substantively meritorious. The
71. Art. 21(1).
72. Art. 22(1).
73. See Appendix at 111(2).
74. Id. In submitting the Convention to the Senate, the Reagan Administration
had indicated its intent to "opt out" of the Committee's work by making a reservation,
pursuant to Article 28, that the United States did not recognize the competence of the
Committee under Article 20 to investigate charges of a systematic practice of torture in
the United States and by declining to make the declarations -necessary to accept the
Committee's other competencies under Articles 21 and 22. See President's Transmittal,
supra note 4, at (iii). The Bush Administration determined, after its review of the
"package," to drop the proposed reservation under Article 28 and to accept the Committee's competence over State-to-State claims. See SENATE ExEc. R P. No. 30, supra
note 4, at Appendix A.
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amount of time and otherwise scarce governmental resources potentially required to respond to specious complaints outweighs any benefit
accorded by "opting in" to the individual complaint mechanism. Declining to accept the Committee's jurisdiction in this regard will not
prevent the United States from participating actively and effectively in
the Committee's work.
VII.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

A final reservation, concerning an issue of public international law,
will be made to the dispute settlement provisions of Article 30(1),
which requires States Party to adhere to a two-step process with regard
to dispute resolution. The process requires States Party to first submit
any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application
of the Convention to arbitration and then, if within six months the arbitration has not been organized, to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. In
keeping with recent U.S. policy regard the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, and as specifically permitted by the "opt out" provision contained in Article 30(2), the reservation will state that the United States
does not consider itself bound by Article 30(1) but reserves the right
specifically to agree to follow this or any other procedure for arbitra75
tion in a particular case.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The United States has been from the outset a strong supporter of
the Torture Convention. The Executive Branch participated actively in
its negotiation, with the endorsement and encouragement of the Congress, and the Senate in giving its advice and consent to ratification
viewed United States ratification as demonstrating a clear national policy of unequivocal opposition to torture as well as a major step forward
in the international community's efforts to eliminate the practice."6
The various provisos upon which advice and consent was conditioned were intended both to clarify points of possible confusion and to
resolve any potential conflicts between the Convention and United
States law. No proviso significantly or substantially modifies the commitment of the United States to carry out its obligations under the
75. See Appendix at 1(2).
76. See SENATE EXEC. REP. No. 30, supra note 4, at 3.
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Convention. Some may contend that a few of these conditions are
overly technical, unnecessary or unduly limiting, and would in any
event have been more appropriately included in the Senate's record of
consideration or in domestic implementing legislation, rather than formally placed in the international record as reservations, declarations or
understandings. Nonetheless, each addresses an actual or perceived difficulty of implementation or interpretation. Taken together, they reflect
the seriousness with which the United States approaches its international undertakings, particularly when they affect the rights and obligations of individuals within its jurisdiction. A close study of the reasons
underlying the provisos may in fact help pave the way for future ratification of other human rights and international criminal law treaties.
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APPENDIX
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
in Executive Session
October 27, 1990
RESOLVED, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by unanimous agreement of the
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1984, and signed
by the United States on April 18, 1988,
Provided that:
I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
reservations:
(1) That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation
under Article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," only insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" means the cruel, unusual and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
(2) That pursuant to Article 30(2) the United States declares that
it does not consider itself bound by Article 30(1), but reserves the right
specifically to agree to follow this or any other procedure for arbitration in a particular case.
II. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following understandings, which shall apply to the obligations of the United States
under this Convention:
(1) (a) That with reference to Article 1, the United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application,
or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that
another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or personality.
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(b) That the United States understands that the definition of torture in Article 1 is intended to apply only to acts directed against persons in the offender's custody or physical control.
(c) That with reference to Article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that "sanctions" includes judicially-imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions authorized by United States law or
by judicial interpretation of such law. Nonetheless, the United States
understands that a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.
(d) That with reference to Article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that the term "acquiescence" requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of
such activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene
to prevent such activity.
(e) That with reference to Article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that noncompliance with applicable legal procedural standards does not per se constitute torture.
(2) That the United States understands the phrase, "where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture," as .used in Article 3 of the Convention, to
mean "if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured."
(3) That it is the understanding of the United States that Article
14 requires a State Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State Party.
(4) That the United States understands that international law does
not prohibit the death penalty, and does not consider this Convention to
restrict or prohibit the United States from applying the death penalty
consistent with the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States, including any constitutional period of confinement prior to the imposition of the death penalty.
(5) That the United States understands that this Convention shall
be implemented by the United States Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered
by the Convention and otherwise by the state and local governments.
Accordingly, in implementing Articles 10-14 and 16, the United States
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to
the end that the competent authorities of the constituent units of the
United States of America may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Convention.
III. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
Published by NSUWorks, 1991

25

Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 5

474

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 15

declarations:
(1) That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles
1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing.
(2) That the United States declares, pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that it recognizes the competence of the
Committee against Torture to receive and consider commtunications to
the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. It is the understanding
of the United States that, pursuant to the above mentioned article,
such communications shall be accepted and processed only if they come
from a State Party which has made a similar declaration.
IV. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
proviso, which shall not be included in the instrument of ratification to
be deposited by the President:
The President of the United States shall not deposit the instrument of ratification until such time as he has notified all present and
prospective ratifying parties to this Convention that nothing in this
Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States as interpreted by the United States.
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